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R202caused by fork collisions can be dealt
with by the traditional DNA damage
checkpoint. In summary, the data
provide compelling evidence that cells
attenuate DNA replication during
periods of heightened transcription to
avoid genomic catastrophes.
Mrc1 is not only required for
replication fork progression but also for
amplification of checkpoint signaling
during replicative stress, for example
when deoxyribonucleotides are
depleted by hydroxyurea (HU) [9,13].
Specifically, Mrc1 serves to amplify
checkpoint signaling by the Rad53
kinase, which involves Mrc1
phosphorylation by Rad53.
Importantly, the Rad53 and Hog1
phosphorylation sites in Mrc1 are
distinct, and themrc13A allele supports
normal checkpoint signaling and cell
survival during replication stress.
Thus, Mrc1 participates in distinct
osmostress and replication stress
pathways, governed by Hog1 and
Rad53, respectively.
The study raises numerous
interesting questions. One concerns
the mechanism of how Mrc1
phosphorylation prevents replication
initiation. Previous results suggest that
assembly of the Cdc45, Mcm2-7, GINS
(CMG) replicative helicase complex is
required for recruitment ofMrc1andPol
ε to the replisome [14,15], whereas
Mrc1 is not normally required for
recruitment of Cdc45 [16]. In this light, it
is surprising that Hog1-phosphorylated
Mrc1 binds origins and delays loading
of Cdc45 and Pol ε [2]. The data imply
that osmostress converts Mrc1 into
a dominant negative inhibitor that binds
pre-RCs andprevents loading of Cdc45
and Pol ε. A possible precedent for
Mrc1 functioning as an inhibitor is
seen in fission yeast, where deletion of
Mrc1 enhances replication initiation
efficiency at some origins and where
Mrc1 can bind origins independently
of Cdc45 [17]. In the future, it will be
interesting to explore the mechanistic
basis of how Mrc1 inhibits origin
firing under different conditions. An
interesting point is that slowing down
replication forks should increase rather
than decrease the probability that
an RNA polymerase encounters
a replication fork. Perhaps Mrc1
phosphorylation not only slows, but
also stabilizes the fork in the event of
collision with RNA polymerase.
Another pressing question iswhether
the conclusions of this study apply to
metazoans. In support of this notion,high osmolarity and other stresses
promote phosphorylation of the
MCM2-7 loading factor Cdt1 by the
mammalian SAPKs p38 and JNK,
thereby inhibiting origin licensing
[18,19]. Whether post-licensing events
of origin firing and fork progression are
also inhibited, and whether this avoids
clashes with transcription, remains to
be tested. Based on the findings by
Duch et al., it seems likely that cells
will use many creative strategies to
manage the conflict between
replication and transcription.References
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Visual EventsAdapting to visual collisions increases the tendency to see the colliding objects
as sliding over one another, rather than as one ‘launching’ another, but only in
the adapted retinal location. This demonstrates a low-level perceptual
component to the interpretation of the causes of visual events.Alan Johnston
Imagine a billiard ball rolling directly
towards another: it makes contact,stops and then the other ball rolls
forwards. Naturally, we see a collision
and have the impression that the first
ball caused the second to move.
Dispatch
R203The philosopher David Hume [1,2],
however, proposed that we could not
deduce the action of the second ball
from only knowing about the first. Many
alternative scenarios are possible.
Hume reasoned that our impression
that the one ball caused the action of
the othermust come from induction. By
induction we conclude all swans are
white because all swans we have ever
seen are white. Hume thought seeing
many examples of one ball hitting
another allowed us to relate cause to
the effect. As they reported recently in
Current Biology, however, Rolfs et al.
[3] have found that adaptation to
collisions can actually reduce the
impression of one object ‘launching’
another, and that this only occurs for
the adapted region of the visual field,
providing evidence for a perceptual
component to the interpretation of
launching as a causal interaction.
Michotte [4] took Hume’s scenario
and studied it by varying the
spatiotemporal parameters of
‘launching’, while asking subjects to
report their impressions of whether one
ball caused the action of the other.
Because he found that the detailed
spatiotemporal properties of the
display had a systematic effect on
the perception of launching, he viewed
the causal impression as perceptual
rather than consciously inferred [5].
However, Michotte relied on subjective
reports.
In their new work, Rolfs et al. [3]
exploited a modification to Michotte’s
launch display which provides for
a gradual transition between causal
and non-causal percepts. If the first ball
in the launching paradigm continues
after first contact, covering the second
ball before it moves off, then it appears
to pass over rather than launch the
second ball. Rolfs et al. [3] varied
the amount of coverage from trial to
trial and recorded the percentage of
trials on which subjects reported the
passing percept. Passing increased
systematically with overlap. After
viewingmultiple instances of collisions,
however, the tendency to see passing
for any particular degree of overlap
increased. Therefore, viewing
collisions reduced the tendency of
subjects to see a collision in a partly
ambiguous display. A crucial
observation was that the effect of
adaptation only occurred when the test
stimuli were presented in the same
retinal location as the adaptor; no
change in responding occurred for testevents located at another retinal
location. If the adaptation altered
expectations in a more cognitive
non-spatial system used for inferring
causal relations, then there would be
no reason for the adaptation to be
space-specific.
Rolfs et al. [3] went further. The
adaption may be localised to the same
position relative to the point of fixation
(a retinotopic frame of reference) or in
the same spatial location on the screen
(a spatiotopic frame of reference). The
authors separated these alternatives
by shifting the point of fixation between
adaptation and test. They found the
adaption effect was completely
retinotopic, allowing them to conclude
that the adaptation must be occurring
somewhere within the retinotopically
mapped peripheral or cortical visual
system. This is strong evidence that the
effect is perceptual, rather than the
result of conscious inference or
anchoring [6]. In the case of anchoring,
the observers might simply be
reporting how different the test
stimulus appeared in comparison to
the just previously seen adaptor.
Rolfs et al.’s [3] results take us away
from the simple cataloguing of
conditions for perceived causality,
because now perceptual causality can
bemanipulated by altering the adaptive
state of the visual system. We do,
however, need to consider what is
being adapted. Clearly the localised
spatial region is not being desensitised
to causality in the most general sense,
as there is no evidence that any other
causal attribution at that spatial
location would be affected by collision
adaptation.
Timing is an important determiner of
causal relationships. We know that
perceived duration [7] and timing [8]
can be altered at specific retinotopic
locations after motion adaptation and
that adaptation to temporal offsets
can alter audiovisual timing [9]. If
adaptation altered the spatiotemporal
characteristic of the collision, this
could have a knock on effect on the
tendency to see launching or passing
over. Many low-level properties of the
stimulus giving rise to the pass percept
are similar to those inducing the
collision percept, and Rolfs et al. [3]
found no effect of adapting to passing
over, suggesting low-level adaptation
is not a key factor, but we should note
the passing over adaptor and the
collision adaptor are necessarily
physically different. In a supplementalexperiment, Rolfs et al. [3] measured
the proportion of launching as a
function of the temporal delay between
the first stimulus stopping and the
second moving: there was no clear
temporal shift in the function after
adaptation, although there was a
reduction in launching, suggesting that
timing is not affected in this paradigm.
Hume pointed out that temporal
coincidence was not enough to
relate two events, we also require
a necessary connection, which means
the cause has the power to deliver
the effect. One aspect of necessary
connection is the notion of
contingency. Contingency can be
reduced if events sometimes occur
without the cause and sometimes the
cause does not generate the effect.
This was studied by Schlottman and
Shanks [10], who showed that the
experience of colour changes in the
second stimulus which reliably
indicated whether it moved or not did
not appear to alter the quality of the
launch percept, supporting the view
that launching was perceptual rather
than a consequence of cognitive
inference. Interestingly, adapting to
passing over, in which the cause did
not deliver the effect, had little
influence.
Adaptation may alter some
perceived property of the objects
involved rather than acting on the
perception of causality directly. In
a very general sense, perception refers
to the processes by which we encode
the causes of the dynamic visual
images impinging on our retinae.
When looking at a statue we
effortlessly become aware of the
three-dimensional shape of the form,
the colour of the material, the direction
of the illumination and where we are in
relationship to the object. We do this
even though each of those physical
causes combine to determine the
brightness of the image at any given
point. Much of what is often referred to
as mid-level vision is concerned with
studying how we unravel the causes of
the image — the inverse problem [11].
The behaviour of objects can also
allow us to perceive aspects of their
physical nature. Uniform motion
implies rigidity. The wobble of jelly
implies compliance. The gloop of
honey implies viscosity. The relative
speeds before and after a collision can
influence the perception of relative
mass [12]. Rolfs et al. [3] consider
adaptation changes the tendency to
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to another — a transfer of the object
property of momentum. This implies
adaptation of a perceptual relationship
rather than an adaptation of an object
property per se. But if that inference is
derived from experience (induction),
even at a perceptual level as advocated
by Helmholtz and Southall [13], it is not
clear why repeated evidence of
collisions should undermine it.
Furthermore, object properties, and
presumably their relations, are properly
tied to objects rather than spatial
locations. A full explanation of causal
adaptation will need to outline what
type of retinotopically specified
representation is altered in the neural
pathway between the stimulus and the
ensuing percept. Nevertheless, this
new paradigm offers a way to study theperception of causality through
adaptation, opening up many new
avenues of investigation.References
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Charm of the Entorhinal CortexA recent study finds that the grid reference system in entorhinal cortex, used for
computing distances during self-localization, has a discretized and modular
organization. This has implications both for how the system develops and also
for how it functions.Kathryn J. Jeffery
In order for a map to work it needs
a metric grid reference (Figure 1A): this
has turned out to be just as true for the
brain as for a mariner’s chart. The
brain’s map grid reference is located in
the entorhinal cortex, in which it was
recently discovered that neurons are
tuned to a combination of distances
and directions [1]. The result of this
tuning is one of the most striking
patterns observed in neurobiology: the
hexagonal polka-dot pattern formed
from patches of activity (or ‘firing
fields’) laid down by the cells as the
animal moves around the environment
(Figure 1B,C). This pattern has led to
the name ‘grid cells’ for these neurons,
and they are thought to serve as
a distance-measuring device (like
a car’s odometer) for the navigation
system.
Grid cells are hard to find and record,
and so initial studies were only able to
sample a few at a time. These early
studies observed that the scale of grids(the distance between the firing fields;
Figure 2A green bars) increases
steadily from the dorsal-most to
ventral-most regions of entorhinal
cortex [1,2], providing capacity for the
brain to represent spaces of different
sizes. These studies also seemed to
find that the orientation of the grids was
coherent across the whole population
for a given animal in a given
environment, leading to the conclusion
that the system acts as an integrated
whole. Now, Stensola et al. [3] have
used an improved method of neuronal
recording that allows the sampling of
many neurons at once (186 in their best
ensemble), and found that, rather than
acting as a single integrated unit, the
cells appear to be organized in
a modular fashion, with the modules
behaving quasi-independently. This
surprising result constrains not only our
models of how the system wires up in
the first place, but also of how it
operates in adulthood.
This modularity finds expression in
a number of ways. First, the increasein the scale of the grids from dorsal
to ventral entorhinal cortex is not
continuous but, surprisingly, discrete.
A hint of this was first reported by Barry
et al. [4] after recording small numbers
of grid cells at a time, and Stensola
et al. [3] have confirmed this with their
large data set. Although absolute grid
scale was evenly distributed across
animals, the ratio between the scale of
one set of grid cells (one module) and
the next appears similar across scales
and also across animals, at around
1.42, though there is considerable
variation. Although these discretized
scales increase from dorsal to ventral
entorhinal cortex, there is overlap, such
that a given dorso-ventral level
contains cells expressing grids of more
than one scale. All in all, there seem to
be four or five of these scale modules in
a given animal, although more may be
revealed with further study of the most
ventral regions (not sampled in this
experiment).
A second kind of modularity was
observed in the orientations of the
grids, which are evidently not coherent,
as first thought, but which also appear
to vary discretely. Since orientation
is thought to be conveyed by a class
of compass-like neurons known as
head direction cells [5], this suggests
that the connection between a given
grid cell and the head direction system
is partly informed by the local network
architecture and is not entirely random.
